AESTHETIC PURPOSES IN THE USE OF THE
POLICE POWER
recent case of State v. Brown,' the North Carolina Supreme
Court invalidated a state statute which required screening or fencing
from public view any junk yard, trash, refuse, or garbage within one
hundred and fifty feet of highways outside incorporated towns.2 The
court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it was an exercise of the police power predicated solely on aesthetic considerations,
without a substantial nexus to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare.8
This decision is supported by cases holding that similar statutes are
unconstitutional when the intention of the legislature was basically
aesthetic. 4 These cases must be distinguished, however, from those
which strike down ordinances because the required physical dimensions
of the fence are inflexible and arbitrary and have no reference to the
question of aesthetics. 5 Moreover, the flat prohibition of all junk-yard
IN

THE

S25o N.C. 54, io8 S.E.d 74. (1959).

Following the decision in this case, the legislature amended the statute to prohibit leaving any trash, refuse, garbage, or scrapped
vehicles on the right of way of any state highway or public road outside incorporated
towns, thus eliminating any reference to fencing or screening from public view. N.C.
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-399 (1953).

GEN. STAT. § 14-399 (Supp. 1959).

' State v. Brown, 25o N.C. 54, 59, io8 S.E.zd 74, 77-78 (z959). It seems that the
motive of the North Carolina legislature was simply to keep land fronting on highways
clean and attractive. The court acknowledged this in its opinion. Ibid.
'See Town of Vestal v. Bennett, 199 Misc. 41, 1o4 N.Y.S.zd 830 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
where the court noted that aesthetic considerations, even though a valid reason for the
ordinance, were not so significant because the ordinance applied everywhere in the towneven to those places hidden from a highway. See also, Pfister v. Municipal Council of
Clifton, 133 N.J.L. 148, 43 A.2d 275 (1945).
'The case most relied upon by the court in the Brown decision was City of New
Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, Inc., 193 La. 895, 19z So. 523 (-939).

The

ordinance in that case required all junk yards to be surrounded by a "substantial
feather-edged board fence" not less than seven feet high, and set up detailed specifications for its construction. The court said that a fencing requirement could be upheld
as a safety measure, but that the particular specifications here were purely arbitrary. Id.
at 9o6-07, 192 So. at 526-27.
See also Steiker v. Borough of East Paterson, x37 NJ.L. 653, 61 A.zd 215 (1948),
where the court could find no valid basis for a fence four to six inches high and for a
one foot setback from property lines. In Vassallo v. Board of Comm'rs, 125 N.J.L.
09, x5 A.2d 603 (1940),

a fencing regulation was held arbitrary because directed

only to automobile junk yards rather than junk yards generally.
In another case there was a dictum to the effect that the fencing requirement had
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operations within a specific distance from a highway, whether or not
they are screened from view, has not been sustained.,
When the courts wish to circumvent the rigid rule that aesthetic
considerations are insufficient as the sole justification for junk-yard
screening, and seek to support the legislature's expression of the public's
growing sensitivity to obnoxious sights, statutory declarations of nuisance
are considered and strained interpretations of the public health and
safety are employed.
In common-law nuisance, mere unsightliness does not justify an
injunction against junk-yard operations. 7 Moreover, statutes declaring
that junk yards are nuisances per se have been invalidated because such
operations are not inherently harmful to the public.8 However, an
ordinance which provided that a junk yard within a specified distance
from a residential or commercial building was a nuisance has been
sustained on the theory that the junk yard interfered with the community's comfortable enjoyment of its property.9
Those courts which have upheld fencing requirements have often
seized upon some element of the public health or safety in order to
support an exercise of the police power. This has occurred in cases where
the legislature has required that the fence be a certain height in order
to screen the yard from the public view.'0 Aesthetic motives are expressly recognized, but the courts often reason that there is sufficient
unreasonable specifications.

Upper Dublin Township v. Suriano, 68 Montg. Co. L.R.

326, 44 Mun. L.R. io8 (Pa. i95z).

The ordinance required that the junk yards be

enclosed by "a tightly-built solid fence or wall constructed of brick, stone, concrete
cement block or other similar matter or materials which shall be of a minimum height
of six feet."
Delawanna Iron & Metal Co. v. Albrecht, 9 N.J. 424, 88 A.zd 616 (195z). Junk
yards were prohibited in this case unless they were completely enclosed, and no part of the
enclosure could be closer than zoo feet to the highway. The distance prohibition was
invalidated, but in a dictum, the court admitted that the fencing requirement, standing
alone, might be upheld. Cf., Township of Howell v. Sagorodny, 46 N.J. Super, 18z,
134 A.2d 452 (App. Div. 1957), where a distance prohibition was not invalidated, but
the conviction was upheld under other sections of the ordinance.
"See, e.g., Feldstein v. Kammauf, 209 Md. 479, z2 A.zd 7x6 (1956).
S"What is not an infringement upon public safety and is not a nuisance, cannot be
made one by legislative fiat and then prohibited." Commonwealth v. Christopher, 184
Pa. Super. 205, 210,

23z

A.zd 714, 716 (1957).

Where an ordinance declared that

automobile junk yards in plain view of a highway were a nuisance even though enclosed by a fence, the court held that it was based on purely arbitrary considerations.
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.zd 188 (x943).
'Town of Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.zd 677 (1942).

See

also, State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 At. 6oi (1933).
10 City of Shreveport v. Brock, 23o La. 65 , 89 So. 2d 156 (1956) ; Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (-943).
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justification for the statute in the protection of passersby, or the elimination of an attractive nuisance."
The most direct means of achieving purely aesthetic objectives in
the regulation of junk yards has been to give local zoning authorities
discretionary authority to withhold permits. Zoning boards may deny
permits for the establishment of junk yards in certain locations in the
absence of any legislative provision. For example, it is not unconstitutional to deny an application to establish an automobile junk yard on
property which, though located in an industrial zone, is also on a main
city thoroughfare and near a residential area. 2
The courts have more readily accepted the aesthetic motivations of
legislatures in other regulatory activities.'
These decisions represent
a dynamic viewpoint and reflect changing social standards. 4 The
modem trend of judicial decision in the regulation of billboards, for
instance, is to sanction aesthetic considerations as the sole justification
for legislative regulation, even though there is some infringement of
the rights of private property.' 5 Occasionally, the flat prohibition of
all billboards has been upheld to preserve scenic beauty and historic
sites.'0 Earlier decisions, however, regarded as constitutional only
"See cases cited note io
P.2d 359 (2953)

supra; People v. Sevel, 120 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 907, 261
(fire risks from gasoline fumes in tanks and greasy upholstery of

secondhand automobiles); Chaiet v. City of East Orange, 136 NJ.L. 375, 56 A.2d 599
(1948).

"="A motor vehicle junk yard is an eyesore. To locate one in close proximity to
property used for residential purposes might reasonably be considered something approaching a public nuisance." Miller v. Zoning Ed. of App., 138 Conn. 61o, 614, 87
A.2d SoS, 81o (295z). See also, Delmar v. Planning & Zoning Ed., i 9 Conn. Supp.
21, io9 A.2d 604 (C.P. 2954).
"1MCQUILLIN, S MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.32 (1957)5 RHYNE, MUNICIPAL
LAW §§ 26-4, 32-24 (-957) 5 YOKLEY, I ZONING LAW AND PRACrICE § 17.1 (Supp.
2958); Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic- Objectives: .4 Reappraisal, 2o LAW & CON-

TEMP. PROB. 218 (1955)5 Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under
the Police Power, 27 So. CAL. L. REV. 149 (1954).
"State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, i~z Wis. 148 96 N.W. 451 (1923). The Su-

preme Court has said that zoning laws enacted under the police power are subject to
gradual change to meet changes in community life. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89 (1926).
" Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 132 Conn. 292, 4o A.2d 177 (1944); General Outdoor Advtg. Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799
(1935), apeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936)5 Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 P. 580
(1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (2928) ; Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph.
Co. 91 , 34 Mun. L.R. 37 (Pa. 1942);
Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Hempstead, 170 Misc.
1027, 29 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 32-

55.

"0City of New Orleans v. Levy,

223

La. 14, 64 So.

2d

798 (1953)

;

City of New
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those regulations which were premised on the promotion of the public
health and safety. 17 The courts now admit that even when the legislature imposes rigid physical restrictions on the size of the billboards for
the general health and safety, the obnoxious effects of the presence of
billboards in residential sections and their blighting effects in industrial
districts are not entirely abated.'
0 epitomizes
The leading Supreme Court case of Berman v. Parker"
the liberal trend of judicial decision. In that case the Court did not
distinguish the applicability of the police power and the power of eminent domain,20 and it appears settled that either or both of these powers
may be used to support legislative policies premised exclusively upon
aesthetic considerations under a liberal conception of what constitutes the
public welfare. 21
Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5'So. 2d 129 (i94x). See also, Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (x955).
1 See, e.g., General Outdoor Advtg. Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309
(193o). A trend toward upholding regulations on aesthetic grounds was noted in this
case, but the court said it could not approve a general prohibition under existing law.
See RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 533-35; Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 730, 73843- (1955)" Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 3o, 129 A.2d 363 (1957). Moreover,
the size of billboards may now be regulated on purely aesthetic grounds under a general
welfare concept. Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 86x (Fla. 1953). Cf., City of Miami
Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (194). See Note, 29,
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1017 (-954).
19 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
20 See Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L.REV. 730 (1955).
" Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion, saying: "Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more conspicuous
examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. . . .The concept
of public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . .The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." 348 U.S. at 32.
Compare the words of Justice Douglas with those of Chief Justice Clarke of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, writing in 1924, in a case cited in the Brown decision.
In regard to the fact that aesthetics were becoming a motive for the use of police power,
he said: "This expresses the uniform trend of legislation in regard to municipalities
which are coming to be viewed not only as instrumentalities for the enforcement of law
and order, but for the abolition of unsightly places and sounds and for the enhancement
not only of the physical conveniences such as lights, water and sewerage, but for the
preservation and improvement of the surroundings that will be pleasing to the eye and
make the city more desirable as a place of residence . ..though a regulation for the
latter purpose alone cannot be sustained except upon compensation under the right of
eminent domain." Turner v. City of New Bern, 187 N.C. 54!, 543-44, 122 S.E. 469,
471 (I924).

The Berman case has been relied upon frequently by the state courts in upholding
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The role of aesthetics has long been accepted in land-use ordinances.
A business may be excluded from a residential district to avoid the
creation of "eyesores," 22 and it is not improper for a zoning ordinance
to require prior approval of plans for proposed structures by a building
board, whose sole criterion is exterior architectural appeal.2 3 The restriction of land use to single-family dwellings is also a proper expression of the desire to maintain the residential character of an area. 24 A
zoning ordinance may also establish minimum dwelling dimensions and
locations within the residential district under a theory of serving community welfare by creating a desirable place in which to live 5
Traditionally, the authority for statutes and ordinances has been the
states' police power to promote the public safety, health, morals, or
general welfare.2 The modern concept of "general welfare" now also
includes aesthetics.27 Prior decisions were to the effect that aesthetics
could be only a subordinate consideration in framing legislative regulations. Today, however, community development demands the frank
recognition of aesthetics as a primary criterion, and recent decisions
uphold this view. Since there has been a liberal use of aesthetics as a
slum clearance programs. See, e.g., Bowker v. City of Worcester, 334 Mass.

422, 136

N.E.2d 208 (1956). See 2 YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 199.1.
2' "If by the term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard merely for outward
appearances, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do
not observe any substantial reason for saying that such a consideration is not a matter
of general welfare. The beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is
for the comfort and happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general way the value
of property in the neighborhood. It is therefore as much a matter of general welfare
as is any other condition that fosters comfort or happiness, and consequent values generally of the property in the neighborhood." State ex rel. Civello v. City of New
Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440, 444- (1923). See also Plerro v. Baxendale, 20
N.J. 17, 118 A.d 401 (1955), where motels were excluded to preserve the beauty of
a residential community.
23 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.zd
217 (i9s5), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (19s5).
2&Elbert v. Village of North Hills, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 190); Best v.
Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. io6, x4 A.zd 6o6 (1958).
'1 Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 1o NJ. i65, 89 A.2d 693 (.952),
appeal disissed, 344- U.S. 919 (1953).
28 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. State of Ill. ex -el. Drainage Comm'r, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(x9o6).

2' As Justice Holmes said in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (19 1):
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. . . . It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare." See also, Sayre, 4esthetics and Property Values: Does
Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
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standard in other areas of municipal law, it now seems desirable to
employ it in the area of junk-yard activity as well.
In the instant decision, the North Carolina court expressed tacit
agreement with the objectives of the state legislature, but could find no
authority which it felt sustained the statute. By virtue of this decision,
the court has failed to take advantage of an opportunity to align North
Carolina with that concept of the general welfare which holds that
aesthetic considerations sanction the use of the police power.

